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INTRODUCTION

Although the United States patent system' balances the interests
of many parties in its enactment, the ultimate goal of the patent
system is to promote progress.' One way that the patent system
accomplishes this goal is by allowing an inventor to start from
something rather than from nothing through the disclosure of
previous inventions.3 In that way, inventors can build on the
foundations laid by others and add one idea to another, thereby
developing a new and useful idea, which can then be used cyclically
in developing another new idea. Isaac Newton recognized the
benefits of foundational scientific advancement in his oft-quoted
letter, "if I have seen further it is by standing on the shoulders of
giants." But, as this Note will explain, the exclusionary rights of
patents will, at times, interfere with the ability of innovators to
build on those foundations laid by others.

1. When this Note refers to "patent law" or a "patent system," it generally means the
United States patent laws or patent system. If it means otherwise, this Note will so specify.
2. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.8.
3. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006).
4. Letter from Isaac Newton to Robert Hooke (Feb. 5, 1676), reprinted in ROBERT K.
MERTON, ON THE SHOULDERS OF GIANTS: A SHANDEAN PosTscRipr, xx (Post-Italianate ed.
1993) (1965).
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In order to obtain a patent for a new discovery,5 an inventor
must file a patent application with the United States Patent and
Trademark Office (USPTO) that contains a full disclosure of the
invention.6 For consideration of the inventor's disclosure,7 the
government grants a patent, which gives the patentee the right to
exclude others from practicing her invention for a limited
time-twenty years from the date of application.' Progress is
promoted because investors and innovators will capitalize upon the
cost of invention and disclose the invention to the public because
they are given an enforceable limited monopoly on the invention.
The public is benefited by the inventive knowledge disclosed, the
inventor is benefited by her potential remuneration, and future
inventors have a backdrop of innovation from which to begin.
The changing landscape of patent technologies has exposed
problems inherent in the patent right to exclude. Rather than
simply granting every patent a term of twenty years, society may
5. The patent system does not reward a discovery per se, even though the discovery may
provide the foundation for innumerable patents. Compare U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.8
("Discoveries"), with 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) ("Inventions patentable"). The Supreme Court has
said that pure scientific discoveries are not patentable, but they must have some actual use.
See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) ("Einstein could not patent his
celebrated law that E=mc2 .... Such discoveries are 'manifestations of... nature, free to all men
and reserved exclusively to none."' (quoting Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333
U.S. 127, 130 (1948))); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 589 (1978) (holding that a 'principle"'
or "fundamental truth"' is unpatentable (quoting Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156,
175 (1853))); Rubber-Tip Pencil Co. v. Howard, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 498, 507 (1874) ("An idea
itself is not patentable ....
").The Australian High Court has suggested, however, that the
distinction between discovery and invention is not useful. Nat'l Research Dev. Corp. v.
Comm'r of Patents (1959) 102 C.L.R. 252,252 (Austl.). This form of proprietarianism in patent
law may defeat the traditional role of patent law because discoveries, like inventions, can be
expensive, labor-intensive, and economically viable. PETER DRAHOs, A PHILOSOPHY OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 209-10 (1996); see, e.g., Genentech Inc.'s Patent [1989] R.P.C. 147
(Eng.) (discussing whether a protein found in human tissue which was useful in the medical
field was an invention).
6. 35 U.S.C. § 112; 37 C.F.R. § 1.71 (2007) ('The specification ...
is required to be in such
full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art or science to
which the invention or discovery appertains ... to make and use the same.").
7. The patent interest could be described as a contract between inventor and
government. The government offers consideration in the form of the exclusionary right while
the inventor agrees to disclose how to make and use the invention. See 35 U.S.C. § 112; Grant
v. Raymond, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 218, 242 (1832) ("The laws which are passed to give effect to [the]
purpose [of patents] ought, we think, to be construed in the spirit in which they have been
made; and to execute the contract fairly on the part of the United States ....
").
8. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a) (2006).
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prefer a patent system that meritoriously awards innovation. 9
Perhaps the patent system could award the inventor of an
antigravitational device (that actually works) a patent term of fifty

years, but to the inventor of a bathroom stall latch a patent term of
five years. Alternatively, the patent system could award patent
terms based on the type of industry; for example, award microelec-

tronic innovation a term of eight years, but mechanical innovation
a term of fifteen years. In other words, the patent system could
place value on how useful the invention is and award a patent term
commensurate to that measure of usefulness." Overhauling the
patent system, however, to have a multiplicity of types of patents

would be legislatively difficult to implement and pragmatically
complicated to practice." This Note explores an alternative method

of exclusivity, reigning in a patent's exclusive right with the goal of
making enforceable patents more accessible to future innovators
sooner-accounting, however, for any potential negative effects on
progress.
Recent court decisions have highlighted the power of the exclusive

right and the debate regarding how far this right extends. 2 The
Federal Circuit in NTP v. Research In Motion (RIM)awarded NTP
a permanent injunction that threatened to force a shutdown of
RIM's popular BlackBerry service.'" NTP, as a company that only
holds patents to license them, did not have any interest in practic9. Thomas Jefferson seemed to have contemplated that the patent system should not
give a right to exclude others, but only give an exclusive rights to the profits of an invention.
See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), in 13 THE WRITINGS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 333-34 (Andrew A. Lipscomb et al. eds., 1903) ("Society may give an
exclusive right to the profits arising from [patents] ...." (emphasis added)). This Note's

advocating of a mandatory licensing regime is consistent with this sentiment. See infra Part
II.

10. For instance, design patents have an exclusive length of fourteen years. 35 U.S.C. §
173 (2006). Jeff Bezos, CEO of Amazon, and Tim O'Reilly, well-known publisher of computerrelated books, have argued that business method and software patents should have a length
of no more than five years. An Open Letter from Jeff Bezos on the Subject of Patents (Mar.
9, 2000), availableat http'J/www.oreilly.com/news/amazon-patents.html.
11. Patent practitioners could cast patent applications in a light so as to get category A
protection as opposed to category B protection. See, e.g., Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 175
(1981) (casting a mathematical process into an apparatus).
12. See generally eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006); NTP, Inc. v.
Research In Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
13. NTP, 418 F.3d at 1287.
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ing its patents. As a result of the court order, RIM had little choice
but to acquiesce to NTP's licensing demands, costing RIM $612.5
million. 14 The Supreme Court in eBay v. MercExchange rejected the
Federal Circuit's "general rule" of permanent injunction1 5 and
instead stated the same traditional four-part equity test used in
other areas of law to determine injunctions in patent suits. 6 These
two decisions elucidate the struggle between exclusive patent rights
and forced compulsory licensing. The NTP decision shows the
windfall that can occur with a valid and infringed patent when the
exclusive right is exercised in an extortive way so that under threat
of injunction, licensing negotiations are lopsided.'" The eBay
decision weakens the exclusive right by taking away the presumption of injunction and providing, as an equitable remedy, a compul18
sory license in denying an injunction under the four-factor test.
Although the right to exclude and the compulsory license are
fundamentally at odds, this Note seeks to harmonize the two and
proffer a patent system framework that incorporates both exclusionary rights and compulsory licensing. Part I will define the
exclusionary interest and compulsory license in terms of a patent.
It will further develop the dichotomy and explore past and current
jurisprudence with regard to the patent holder's right to exclude.
Part II will introduce a patent system change, a new framework
that will attempt to reward patentees with the right to exclude, yet
create a mandatory licensing scheme for certain patentees. Finally,
Part III will theoretically apply the framework to the pharmaceutical industry and patent licensing companies in an attempt to
elucidate the possible effects the framework would have on the
promotion of progress.

14. See Mark Heinzl, BlackBerry Case Could Spur Patent-Revision Efforts, WALL ST. J..
Mar. 6, 2006, at B4.
15. MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2005), rev'd, 547
U.S. 388 (2006).
16. eBay, 547 U.S. at 393 (holding that traditional equitable principles do not permit
broad classifications and that each case must be adjudicated applying the four-factor test
anew). For discussion of the four-factor test, see infra note 105 and accompanying text.
17. See infra Part I.D.
18. The Federal Circuit had a '"general rule,' unique to patent disputes, 'that a permanent
injunction will issue once infringement and validity have been adjudged.' eBay, 547 U.S. at
393-94 (quoting eBay, 401 F.3d at 1338).

2009]

HARMONIZING THE EXCLUSIONARY RIGHTS OF PATENTS 1401

I. THE EXCLUSIONARY RIGHT AND COMPULSORY LICENSE
DICHOTOMY

A. Exclusionary Rights in Patents
The source of exclusionary right of patents is rooted in the
Constitution. 9 "The Congress shall have Power ...
To promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times
to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries."2 Congress has implemented this right
in 35 U.S.C. § 154, which states, "Every patent shall ...
grant to the
patentee ...
the right to exclude others from making, using, offering
for sale, or selling the invention throughout the United States or
importing the invention into the United States .....
1 A patent is a
grant to exclude, not a grant to practice; hence the responsibility
to assert the exclusionary interest against a potential infringer
falls on the patentee.22 The exclusionary right, however, is subject
to restrictions, such as compulsory licensing in the courts and
statutory provisions.
B. Compulsory Licenses in Patents
According to Black's Law Dictionary, a compulsory license is a
"statutorily created license that allows certain people to pay a
royalty and use an invention without the patentee's permission."23
The patent system already contains elements of compulsory
licensing.2 4 For instance, the patent system allows a court in an
infringement proceeding to "grant injunctions in accordance with
the principles of equity to prevent the violation of any right secured
19. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.
8.
20. Id. (emphasis added).
21. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2006).
22. Claire v. Kastar, Inc., 138 F.2d 828, 831 (2d Cir. 1943) ("[I]t is scarcely necessary at
this day once more to expose the fallacy that a patent gives any right to the patentee to
practice his disclosure. It merely enables him to stop others from practising it.").
23. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 938 (8th ed. 2004).
24. But see id. ('While some nations currently recognize compulsory licenses, the United
States never has.").
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by patent, on such terms as the court deems reasonable."25 So when
a court fails to grant a permanent injunction despite infringement,
a compulsory license is created.
One of the most famous cases where a court denied an injunction
was in City of Milwaukee v. Activated Sludge.26 Activated Sludge
sued the City of Milwaukee for infringement of a patent in processing raw sewage." The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit,
however, did not grant an injunction against the City because the
alternative was for Milwaukee instead to dump the sewage into
Lake Michigan, the source of the city's drinking water, posing a
public health hazard.2 8 Even though the court did not enjoin the
city, it did award monetary damages to Activated Sludge, effectively
granting a compulsory license for use of the patent.2 9
Other examples of compulsory licenses in the patent system
include patents whose subject matter cover areas of technology of
particular interest to the government or public welfare."0 Furthermore, the federal government cannot be excluded from using a
patent-hence a compulsory license is mandatory.3 Finally, antitrust violations can also lead to a compulsory license. 2 For example,
when a licensing arrangement harms competition through pricefixing or market division, the competitor can be given a royalty-free
(compulsory) license."

25. 35 U.S.C. § 283 (2006).
26. 69 F.2d 577 (7th Cir. 1934).
27. Id. at 593.
28. Id.
29. See id.
30. See 35 U.S.C. § 181 (2006). An application can be made secret, essentially ferreting
away patent rights, if it concerns subject matter that, if revealed, could be detrimental to
national security. See id.
31. See 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) (2006) (stating that the only remedy a patentee has against
the U.S. government is "reasonable and entire compensation").
32. See generally ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
ANTITRUST HANDBOOK

239-46 (2007).

33. See STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS, S. COMM. ON THE
JuDICIARY, 86TH CONG., REPORT ON COMPULSORY LICENSING OF ANTITRUST JUDGMENTS 13
(Comm. Print 1960); U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES
FOR THE LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 7 (1995), available at http://www.usdoj.

gov/atr/public/guidelines/0558.pdf.
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C. Problems with the Right To Exclude
1. Patent Overlap and the Thicket
Unlike a piece of real property, the boundary of a patent property
right is not so easily determinable. Patents consist of one or more
"claims" which legally define what the patent covers, but claims can
overlap between different patents. 34 A series of patents are analogous to a set of Russian wooden matryoshka dolls, with each
individual patent being a slightly smaller, more defined iteration of
the largest. One patentee can hold a patent that actually resides
inside the rights of another patent, which resides in another patent,
and so on.
A real life example of patent stack-up occurs in the area of high
technology in "patent thickets."35 According to Carl Shapiro, a
patent thicket is a "dense web of overlapping intellectual property
rights that a company must hack its way through in order to
actually commercialize new technology."3 6 One technological device
can implement hundreds of components, and in turn, each of these
components can "read on" thousands of patents.3 7 When one product
utilizes thousands of patents, each patentee has the potential to
extract a licensing fee or royalty from use of the patented technology. Royalty stacking occurs when the aggregate of the royalties
exceeds the value of the end use or profitability.38 Patent holdup
happens when one of the patentees from which a product manufacturer must obtain a license refuses to license, prohibiting the entire
product from being marketable.3 9 The following section will express
these ideas in a simple example.

34. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006); 37 C.F.R. § 1.75 (2007).
35. Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and
Standard Setting, in 1 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 119, 119 (Adam B. Jaffe, Josh

Lerner & Scott Stern eds., 2001).
36. Id. at 120.
37. FED. TRADE COMM'N, To PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION
AND PATENT LAw AND POLICY ch. 2, 28 (2003), available at http:lwww.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/

innovationrpt.pdf; Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85
TEX. L. REV. 1991, 1992 (2007).

38. See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 37, at 2010-17.
39. See id.
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2. An Example of Patent Overlap, Patent Holdup, and Royalty
Stacking
Suppose there are three inventors who hold patents on variations
of a table. Inventor A's patent (A) is for a table that comprises a flat
surface and at least three legs attached to the flat surface. Inventor
B's patent (B) is for a table like A's, but adds one wheel attached to
each leg. Inventor C has a patent (C) like A's and B's, but adds a
locking mechanism to the wheels. Inventor A's patent is not limited
by wheels, so it is broader than B or C. Patents B and C contain all
of the elements of A but add further limitations, so they reside
completely within patent A. Patent C likewise resides completely in
patent B. In other words, these patents are stacked up like the
matryoshka doll with A being the largest doll, B the next, and C the
smallest of the three. Assuming all these patents are valid, patent
law is such that inventor A can exclude both B and C from making,
using, or selling their inventions.4' Likewise, inventor B can exclude
inventor C.41 The situation as described here is simple; however,
cascading patent rights can quickly become complicated when one
patent combines the claims of several other patents that combine
the claims of several other patents, and so on.
If a person owns the outermost matryoshka doll figure and denies
access to the next doll inside, the fact that the inner doll is owned by
someone else does not matter-she can still be denied access
because her patent falls completely within the patent rights of
another. Furthermore, the owner of the inside doll can prevent the
owner of the outside doll from making, using, or selling the improved table-although the outside doll has a broader claim, the
inside doll still presents a barrier. Thus, each higher level patent
presents an absolute barrier to the successful product marketization
of each narrower patent, and each narrower patent presents a
specific barrier to full product marketization of the higher level
patent by carving out pockets of exclusivity and giving them to
someone else. This concept is difficult to understand in the table
example because each successive invention is trivial or, in patent
terms, obvious. The idea is that inventor A's patent clearly covers
40. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2006).
41. See id.
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the material of inventor B's patent, because B's patent only adds to
A's. Inventor A, however, never contemplated B's contribution, so
B's patent carves out her inventive addition and gives B the
exclusive right in it. Inventor A also has an exclusive right in B's
patent, insofar as A's patent overlaps with B's.
Inventor A has an incentive not to exclude inventors B and C
access to their patents because A would also like to sell tables that
have wheels and locks. Without a licensing agreement, however, B
and C could stop her.42 So if all the patentees in a patent stack up
desire to use their patents, then they have an incentive to crosslicense their respective patent rights to each other.4 3 In this
hypothetical, the public benefits because more table manufacturers
can exist, and therefore the public has more choice in design, there
is competition in the market, and tables are more accessible.
Imagine now inventors D, E, F, and G, all holding further
cascading rights on improvements of A's original table patent. Even
if G's inventive improvement of the table were some sort of revolutionary operating table that would not affect the marketability of
any of A-F's patents, G could be excluded from using her patent by
any one of A-F. Inventor G can produce her operating tables, but
runs the risk of facing, absent prearranged license agreements,
patent holdup-expensive litigation and injunction. 44 If A-F are
willing to license their agreements, but the monetary cost of such
agreements together exceeds the market value of G's invention,
royalty stacking has occurred. 45 The market value of G's invention
can be exceeded because each patent in the chain has the right to
exclude, so the negotiated licensing value of each of A-F's patent
could be understood as nearly the entire market value of the
subjected invention. 46 If G could identify each of A-F ex ante, then
the likelihood of coming to a successful licensing agreement is much
greater because A-F could demand an amount that would still keep
G profitable. One unidentified patentee could then ex post demand
42. See ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 59-64 (2004)
(explaining how cross-licensing applies to a technology thicket). See generally Shapiro, supra
note 35.
43. See JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 42.

44. See generally Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 37, at 2010-17.
45. Id.
46. Id.

1406

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50:1395

a royalty that would make the G's business unprofitable. The right
to exclude is a powerful right, especially in areas with high levels of
patent overlap.
3. Patently Valid and Invalid Patents
a. Invalid Patents and the Presumptionof Validity
The right to exclude is further bolstered by the statutory provision that patents are presumptively valid. 7 In litigation, courts
require clear and convincing evidence to find a patent invalid. 8
Although this provision provides some stability in patent infringement litigation for the patent holder, it also means that both valid
and invalid patents have the same presumption of validity,
resulting in licenses and judgments against infringers that can later
be obfuscated.4 9 The USPTO's goal is to ensure that no more than 4
percent of issued patents are invalid. ° To determine compliance
with these goals, the USPTO takes a random sample of patent
applications that have been approved for allowance and does a
supervisory review of them. 1 From the available data one can
estimate that at least 5500 of the issued patents in 2007 are
actually invalid.5 2 A more in-depth analysis of the selected reviewed
patents, rather than a supervisory review, may reveal even more
invalid patents.

47. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2006) ("A patent shall be presumed valid. Each claim of a patent
(whether in independent, dependent, or multiple dependent form) shall be presumed valid
independently of the validity of other claims .... ").
48. 35 U.S.C. § 273(b)(4) (2006) ("A person asserting the defense under this section shall
have the burden of establishing the defense by clear and convincing evidence.").
49. See infra Part I.C.3.b.
50. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT
FISCAL YEAR 2007, at 40, available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/annual
2007/2007annualreport.pdf.
51. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE
§ 1308.03 (8th ed., Aug. 2001, rev. Sept. 2007), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/
pac/mpep/index.html [hereinafter MANUAL].
52. U.S. PATENT

& TRADEMARK

OFFICE, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT

FISCAL YEAR 2007, supra note 50, at 40, 113. A 3.5 percent error rate times 160,000 issued
patents in 2007 equals over 5500 invalid patents.
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b. Complications in Adjudicating Invalid Patents
This situation presents a real problem in the adjudication of a
patent that may actually be invalid. Because the patent is presumed
valid and requires clear and convincing evidence to invalidate, a
defendant runs a higher chance of losing on the question of validity
even if the patent should never have been issued.53 The USPTO
does, however, offer a means of rectifying the issuance of invalid
patents. A third party can present a "substantial, new question of
patentability" to the USPTO with regard to a patent and the
USPTO can elect to reexamine it. 54 The standard of review employed
when reexamining a patent is the "preponderance of the evidence"
standard, meaning that a patent can be invalidated more easily in
reexamination proceedings than in litigation.5 5 When infringement
litigation proceeds, the defendant will often seek reexamination of
the alleged patents and ask for a stay in the proceedings pending
the outcome of the reexamination."
The back and forth of reexamination may take three or more
years to complete. If the examiner invalidates the patents or parts
thereof, the patentee can appeal, further prolonging the reexamination.57 If the judge decides to stay litigation proceedings in light of
concurrent reexamination, the patentee may have to wait several
years to have the infringement suit heard. On the other hand, if the
infringement suit is not stayed and the patent is held valid under
the clear and convincing standard, but invalid in reexamination, the
alleged infringer may bizarrely be enjoined in court based on a
patent that is ultimately invalidated.5"
In NTP v. Research In Motion, that is essentially what
happened.5 9 RIM is the creator of the BlackBerry, a system for
53. JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 42, at 152 (explaining that the defendant in an
infringement suit may not call into question the integrity of the examination process).
54. 35 U.S.C. §§ 303(a), 304 (2006).
55. MANUAL, supra note 51, § 2286, at 2200-143 ("[]]in the Office, it is sufficient to show
nonpatentability by a 'preponderance of evidence."'); see, e.g., 37 C.F.R. § 41.207(a)(2) (2007).
56. See 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.510, 1.515 (2007) (reexamination); see, e.g., NTP, Inc. v. Research
In Motion, Ltd., 397 F. Supp. 2d 785, 787-88 (E.D. Va. 2005) (mem.) (denying a motion to stay
an injunction in light of reexamination proceedings).
57. See MANUAL, supra note 51, § 1201 (appeal).
58. See infra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
59. 418 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
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sending and receiving emails wirelessly from a pager-like device.6"
NTP sued RIM for infringement of some of its patents that covered
technology used in the BlackBerry communications network.6 The
district court found that the patent was valid and infringed,
awarding monetary damages of roughly $50 million. Additionally,
the court ordered an injunction against RIM, but stayed the
injunction pending appeal.62 Meanwhile, RIM petitioned the USPTO
for reexamination of NTP's patents in question in the lawsuit and
the USPTO began reexamination proceedings on those and several
other of NTP's related patents sua sponte. On appeal by RIM, the
Federal Circuit affirmed and remanded the case to the district court
for enforcement. 63 RIM then appealed to the Supreme Court, but
was denied certiorari.6 4 On remand for enforcement of the judgment,
RIM moved to stay the enforcement of the injunction pending the
outcome of the reexamination, but the motion was denied.6 5 With
injunction imminent, RIM finally acquiesced to licensing terms
with NTP at the expense of $612.5 million.66 Two years later, the
reexamination proceedings issued a final rejection of all claims in all
the disputed patents, invalidating the very same patents that RIM
was forced to license from NTP because the district court had found
the claims valid under the clear and convincing standard.6 7 Pending
further appeals of the reexamination rejections by NTP, it seems as
though RIM has purchased rights to over $650 million of nothing.6 8
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. NTP, Inc. v. Research In Motion, Ltd., No. Civ.A. 3:01 CV 767, 2003 WL 23100881, at
**1-2 (E.D. Va. Aug. 5, 2003).
63. Research In Motion, Ltd. v. NTP, Inc., 418 F.3d at 1312.
64. Research In Motion, Ltd. v. NTP, Inc., 546 U.S. 1157 (2006) (denying certiorari).
65. NTP, Inc. v. Research In Motion, Ltd., 397 F. Supp. 2d 785, 788 (E.D. Va. 2005) (mem.)
("Valid patents would be rendered meaningless if an infringing party were allowed to
circumvent the patents' enforcement by incessantly delaying and prolonging court proceedings
which have already resulted in a finding of infringement.").
66. The license agreement included all rights to all applicable NTP patents. Heinzl, supra
note 14.

67. Sheri Qualters, Patent Review Overhaul Draws Praise:A Process Once Viewed as
Risky May Help Avoid Costly Delays and Suits, NA'L L.J., Oct. 1, 2007, at 5, 8-9 (stating that
Research In Motion asked the patent office to reexamine two patents held by NTP, but the
patent office independently decided to examine six other NTP patents and rejected all the
claims in the reexamined patents).
68. If the patents are declared and held invalid through the appellate process, the result
would be a judicial quandary that would have directly cost RIM over $650 million.
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This outcome is problematic, especially in light of the fact that there
was no evidence that RIM did in fact infringe, that is, actually copy
the content of the patent-it seemed to have developed its technology independently of the NTP patents.6 9
The ironic result in NTP v. RIM leads one to question whether the
scope of the exclusive right goes too far. In light of the Supreme
Court decision in eBay v. MercExchange, an opinion issued a mere
two months after the Federal Circuit decision in NTP, it is unclear
whether the NTP outcome would be the same today.7"
4. The Absoluteness of the Right
One of the main problems with the right to exclude is the
absoluteness of the right. As discussed above, a patent, although
presumed valid, is not necessarily valid, so the absoluteness of the
exclusionary right does not seem like a perfect fit as a remedy for
infringement.7 1 If all patents were 100 percent valid, then perhaps
injunction, and therefore exclusion, should be the standard. But in
the computer and electrical technology areas where patent overlap
is systemic, patents are more likely to have a percentage of validity
or a patent "strength" factor.72
In free market negotiation of a license the perceived strength of
the patent is taken into account by the parties-the patentee
Reasonably, one might wonder how NTP was suffering "irreparable harm" if they were to turn
around and license the technology to RIM. See NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., No.
Civ.A. 3:01CV767, 2003 WL 23100881, at *1 (E.D. Va. Aug. 5, 2003) ("This Court FINDS that
...
NTP will be face [sic] irreparable harm if an injunction is not issued ....
).The jury awarded
NTP a reasonable royalty rate of 5.7 percent, resulting in $23 million, which figured in the
court's overall damage assessment of almost $54 million. NTP, 418 F.3d at 1291-92.
69. See generally NTP, 418 F.3d 1282. Although independent creation of a patented
technology is not a defense to infringement, from the perspective of the defendant in an
infringement action they are not morally a wrongdoer. Schnadig Corp. v. Gaines Mfg. Co., 620
F.2d 1166, 1168 n.3 (6th Cir. 1980) ("[A]n 'inventor' who produces something already patented
infringes the patent regardless of his knowledge of its existence."). If the infringement were
intentional, then it would at least be morally culpable, even if the patents are ultimately
invalid. If the patents remain invalid, NTP was not a legal or moral wrongdoer, yet still had
to pay.
70. See infra Part I.D.
71. See supra Part I.C.3.a.
72. Lemley & Shapiro, supranote 37, at 2010-17 (explaining how the negotiation process
involves a strength of patent element).
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asserting the patent knows that at least some of the prior patents
or publications that would tend to invalidate the patent, and the
accused infringer would likely perform an exhaustive search for
invalidating fodder as well.73 So the patent strength could be
described as the probability that a court would find the patent valid
or invalid under the appropriate standard.7 4 The negotiated amount
is not necessarily a prediction of what a court would ultimately
decide. Instead, the negotiation more accurately tries to predict the
damages a court would find,75 but then tempers that number by the
patent strength.76 Because a court does not have the leeway to
determine that a patent is strong or weak-it is either valid or
not-the damages found by the court cannot fully comprehend what
free market negotiations would have produced.
5. Abusing the Right To Exclude
Changing the patent term from seventeen years from issuance to
twenty years from filing is probably the most significant change in
legislated patent rights in recent years.7 7 On its face, the change
seems to include no substantive difference. If a typical examination
takes three years to complete, seventeen added to the three-year
examination period equals the twenty-year new patent term. A
patent applicant, however, could strategically prolong examination
indefinitely.
One famous example of prolonged examination was by Jerome
Lemelson. On December 24, 1954, he filed a 150-page application
from which he formed the basis of twenty-three issued patents. 78 His
73. Id.; see 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2006).
74. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 273(b)(4), 282 (2006).
75. See 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006). Although a court attempts in finding the reasonable
royalty to mimic free market negotiations, the method falls short due to unavailability of data.
See Patent Baristas, What's a Reasonable Royalty Rate?, http://www.patentbaristas.com/
archives/2005/11/17/whats-a-reasonable-royalty-rate/ (last visited Feb. 28, 2009).
76. See Lemley & Shapiro, supranote 37, at 2010-17; Jay Pil Choi, How Reasonable is the
7Reasonable'RoyaltyRate? Damage Rules and ProbabilisticIntellectual Property Rights 1-4
(Mich. State Univ., Dep't of Econ., Ctr. for Econ. Studies and Ifo Inst. for Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 1778,2006), availableat http'J/papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
id=926037.
77. Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 532, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994)
(codified as 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2000)).
78. GREGORY A. STOBBS, SOFTWARE PATENTS § 12.12, at 215-17 (Cum. Supp. 2007).
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tactic was to delay issuance of the patents by amending claims and
filing continuing applications to mete out the disclosure of the
original specification, hoping to make new claims that would cover
successful products from which he could then extract licensing
fees.79 For example, his most recent patent based on that 1954
application was filed on January 25, 1993, but did not issue until
January 2, 2001, almost eight years later.' The patent will be in
force until January 2, 2018, sixty-four years after his original
filing.8 ' In another patent based on the first application in 1954,
Lemelson claimed to have invented the bar code, but rather than
suing bar code makers, he sued bar code users and was able to
extract over $1.5 billion in licensing fees before his bar code patent
was finally invalidated by declaratory judgment in 2004.2
The 1999 change in patent terms from seventeen years from
issuance to twenty years from filing solved the problem of prolonged
applications because patent rights now expire from the filing date
rather than from the issuance date. More recently, commentators
have questioned the practices of patent licensing companies,
commonly called "patent trolls."83 A patent troll is a company that
owns and licenses patents, but does not practice any patents itself.'
The dual use of the "troll" moniker as a noun and verb describes
both the general disdain for these companies by corporate America
and the typical strategy for a patent licensing company.8 5 The
strategy is to cast out as many "cease and desist" letters to potential
79. Id.
80. U.S. Patent No. 6,169,840 (filed Jan. 25, 1993).
81. The claims that read on the original 1954 specification will have pended for the full
period. See id. (filed Jan. 25, 1993) (showing ancestry to 1954 patent includes continuation-inpart).
82. Symbol Techs. v. Lemelson Med., Ed. & Research Found., 301 F. Supp. 2d 1147, 1167
(D. Nev. 2004), affd, 422 F.3d 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2005); STOBBS, supranote 78, § 12.12[A], at 217.
83. The phrase was first used by the assistant general counsel at Intel Corp. who claims,
"We were sued for libel for the use of the term 'patent extortionists' so I came up with 'patent
trolls."' Brenda Sandburg, You May Not Have a Choice. Trolling for Dollars,LAW.COM, July
30, 2001, http://www.phonetel.com/pdfs/LWTroUs.pdf.
84. Id. The general counsel of Intel explains, "A patent troll is somebody who tries to
make a lot of money off a patent that they are not practicing and have no intention of
practicing and in most cases never practiced." Id.
85. Troll means both to "fish by trailing a baited line boat," and a "mythical, cave-dwelling
being depleted in folklore as either a giant or a dwarf, typically having a very ugly
appearance." THE NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY 1803 (2d ed. 2005).
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infringers as possible and hope they bite by agreeing to set up
licensing agreements, rather than face a lawsuit.8 6 Some commentators defend the practice of trolling as a valid business model, while
others vehemently oppose it largely because of the threat of
injunction, using the courts as a bargaining chip in licensing
agreements, and the questionable validity of certain patents.8 7
Pharmaceutical patents present another area of modern day
"abuse" of patents. Some have said that the pharmaceutical
industry in the United States is a shining beacon of the patent
system at work, but others criticize pharmaceutical companies for
taking patent protection too far.' The pharmaceutical industry has
perhaps reaped the reward of strong patent protection like no other
industry.8 9 The ten pharmaceutical companies in the Fortune 500
combine yearly profits that exceed the rest of the Fortune 500
combined, which amounts to a staggering amount of money.90 While
pharmaceutical companies and big-business pundits might say,
"that's just business," one might wonder if society is receiving a bad
bargain when companies can profit so much on only a handful of
inventions. 91
Perhaps the examples of the "patent troll" and the blockbuster
profits of the pharmaceutical industry are not "abuse" per se, but
there is a valid question as to whether the activities of these
industries really fulfill the aims of the patent system. This question
will be explored in more depth in Part III.

86. See Donald J. Chisum, Reforming Patent Law Reform, 4 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL.
PROP. L. 336, 340 (2005).
87. See eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 394 (2006) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) ("T]he threat of an injunction is employed simply for undue leverage in
negotiations...."). CompareChisum, supranote 86, at 340 ("The ugly, evil troll then leaps up
and demands a huge toll ...."), with Naomi R. Lamoreaux & Kenneth L. Sokoloff, Inventors,
Firms, and the Market for Technology in the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries,
in LEARNING BY DOING IN MARKETS, FIRMS AND COUNTRIES 19 (Naomie R. Lamoreaux et al.
eds., 1999) (describing the early patented technology licensing market which helped small
inventors make a living).
88. See infra notes 154-62 and accompanying text.
89. See infra notes 154-62 and accompanying text.
90. See infra note 155.
91. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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6. The Problem of Weak Patents
a. The Slow To Adapt USPTO
The patent landscape of the modern era is pocked with sinkholes
of ambiguity. Presumably, the USPTO does its best when it approves a patent application for issuance, but the Office has been
too slow to develop and adapt to modern technological innovations
and emerging technologies. For instance, commentators have
argued that the USPTO was not properly equipped to examine the
emerging business method industry.92 Patents were awarded for
innovation that came to the USPTO for the first time in a patent
application, but had existed in the real world for quite some time.93
In the area of business methods, Congress recognized the
USPTO's late start in examining business method patent applications,9 4 and created a statutory exception so that if someone were
using a business method prior to the existence of a patent, they
could not be held liable for infringement." This exception is
somewhat analogous to the defense of independent creation in the
copyright realm of intellectual property. 6
The inability of the USPTO as an institution to adapt quickly to
court decisions regarding patents leads to weak patents. The
USPTO relies heavily on its databases of issued patents and
pending patent applications to determine if a patent application in

92. JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 42, at 145-48. The USPTO does not have a reliable or
consistent method of searching prior art in databases other than their own. Id. at 147-48.
93. See id. at 146-47.
94. Business method patent applications exploded in the wake of State Street Bank &
Trust Co. v. SignatureFin. Group,Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998). See USPTO, Class 705
Application Filing and Patents Issued Data, http://www.uspto.gov/web/menulpbmethodl
applicationfiling.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2009) (showing that between 1998 and 1999
Business Method patent applications more than doubled from 1337 to 2852 and that in the
following year, 2000, applications doubled again with 7733 filings). State Street opened the
door by exclaiming, "[wie take this opportunity to lay this iU-conceived [business method]
exception to rest." 149 F.3d at 1375.
95. 35 U.S.C. § 273(b)(1) (2006).
96. Sheldon v. MGM Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 54 (2d Cir. 1936) ("[If by some magic a
man who had never known it were to compose anew Keats's Ode on a Grecian Urn, he would
be an 'author,' and if he copyrighted it, others might not copy that poem, though they might
of course copy Keats's.").
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consideration is actually new and non-obvious.9" If that database
does not exist or it contains a paucity of references, then early
patent applicants in an emerging area have an advantage due to the
lack of prior references.9 8
b. One Patent Equals One Invention
The USPTO applies the rule that one patent application should
claim only one invention.9 9 This rule makes sense for a chemical
compound, as even a slight variation in a chemical structure can
produce completely different results. In the high tech industry,
however, it might make more sense if the USPTO could follow the
unity of invention approach. This approach is followed in the Patent
Cooperation Treaty for international patent applications and is
defined as a "group of inventions so linked as to form a single
1 ° If the
general inventive concept.""
USPTO allowed a domestic
applicant to apply for a unity of invention patent then the inventors
of a single computer chip that integrates fifty different patentable
innovations, for example, may need to file only one application."'
Some contend that this approach would vastly simplify patent
prosecution in the high technology areas and result in stronger
patents. 12
D. Compulsory Licensing-A Change in JudicialAttitude
The tone has changed recently in the Supreme Court's patent
jurisprudence. In eBay v. MercExchange, the Court unanimously
overturned a long standing practice in the Federal Circuit of
97. See U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, General Information Concerning Patents,
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/dod/general/index.html#top (last visited Feb. 28, 2009).
98. See generally id.
99. 37 C.F.R. § 1.141 (2007).
100. MANUAL, supra note 51, 1850, R. 13.1.
101. Compare 37 C.F.R. § 1.141 (2007), with 37 C.F.R. § 1.475 (2007) (restricting a patent
application to one invention in national patent application but allowing an application for a
unity of invention in an international application).
102. See, e.g., Letter from Charles M. Kinzig, Vice President Corporate Intellectual Prop.,
GlaxoSmithKline, to Kathleen Kahler Fonda, Legal Advisor, Office of the Deputy Comm'r for
Patent Examination 3-4 (Oct. 15, 2007), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/
dapp/opla/comments/markush/gsk.pdf.
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awarding permanent injunctions except in extraordinary circumstances.' 0 3 Although the widespread effect of this ruling will develop
over the next several years, the district court on remand denied
MercExchange's request for a permanent injunction. 10 4 The court
employed the four-factor equity test requiring that the
plaintiff ...
demonstrate: (1) that it has suffered an irreparable

injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as monetary
damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that,
considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and
defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the
public5interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunc0
tion.
In applying the four-factor equity test, the court found that
MercExchange could not show "irreparable injury," thus rejecting
the former standard that irreparable injury was presumed.' 6 In its
analysis, the court emphasized that MercExchange did not practice
its patents as a patent holding and licensing company, and that in
the initial court proceeding MercExchange did not ask for injunctive
relief.0 7 The court also found that because MercExchange sought to
use the injunction as a bargaining chip in negotiation, the court
could instead order damages that would adequately remedy the
controversy.0 8 In so holding, the court looked to the concurring
opinion by Justice Kennedy in the Supreme Court opinion: 1 9
An industry has developed in which firms use patents not as
a basis for producing and selling goods but, instead, primarily
for obtaining licensing fees. For these firms, an injunction, and
103. 547 U.S. 388, 391-94 (2006).
104. MereExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 500 F. Supp. 2d 556 (E.D. Va. 2007). For a
tracking of injunctions since eBay, see Joseph Scott Miller, The Fire of Genius: Injunction,
http://www.thefireofgenius.comlinjunctions (last visited Feb. 28, 2009).
105. eBay, 547 U.S. at 391 (citation omitted).
106. MercExchange, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 568-69. The court upheld the enacted patent right
that the Federal Circuit has used to justify the presumption of irreparable harm, concluding
that any "additional leverage in licensing" is "anatural consequence of the right to exclude
and not an inappropriate reward" to the patent holder. MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc.,
401 F.3d 1323, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2005), rev'd, 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
107. MercExchange, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 570-73.
108. Id. at 582.
109. Id.
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the potentially serious sanctions arising from its violation, can
be employed as a bargaining tool to charge exorbitant fees to
companies that seek to buy licenses to practice the patent. When
the patented invention is but a small component of the product
the companies seek to produce and the threat of an injunction is
employed simply for undue leverage in negotiations, legal
damages may well be sufficient to compensate for the infringement and an injunction may not serve the public interest.110
These words strike out at the practice of using the courts as tools
of negotiation for licensors of patented technologies. The spirit of
Justice Kennedy's words-that the patentee's right to exclude
should be exercised when actually trying to exclude and not simply
to gain a better bargaining position-are relied on in the framework
that follows. This Note takes this idea a step further by contending
that any patentee who dilutes the patent's right to exclude should
lose it.
II. THE BALANCING FRAMEWORK
A. A Shortened Exclusive Right
The framework that this Note suggests is basic in concept but
analyzing its potential effect on patent policy is a much more
difficult task. Essentially, patents would issue in much the same
way they do now and would be entitled to a certain period of
protection."' The difference is that the patent right is bifurcated
into periods of exclusive rights and a remaining period of licensing
rights. While property rights exist for the patent's entire life, the
right to exclude is initially shortened but renewable under certain
circumstances, and the remainder of the patent's life is subject
to mandatory licensing." 2 The right to exclude would be renewable
in many circumstances, and when such circumstances warrant,
the patentee could extend the exclusive interest up to the entire
enforceable life of the patent-twenty years from filing. The
110. eBay, 547 U.S. at 396-97 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
111. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2006) (currently twenty years from date of filing).
112. Mandatory licensing as used in this Note is the same as compulsory licensing in the
sense that a patentee who is subject to mandatory licensing has no recourse to exclude an
infringer, but may only collect fees for use.
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circumstances allowing for extension of the exclusionary right may
include cases where the patentee practices the patent, the patentee
holds the patent as a method for preventing competitors from
marketing a product that is closely related to a patent that the
patentee practices (blocking patent),11 3 the patentee is a research
organization and requires exclusive patent protection for incentive
to further develop and enhance the invention, or some other worthy
exceptions.
For the purposes of this Note and discussion of the proposed
framework, it may be helpful to provide a concrete example of the
system with some of the variables filled in. Consider a patent
system in which a patentee has five years from the date of filing the
application to start a timer on three years of exclusive patent
rights." 4 The timer would begin upon issuance of the patent or at
the five-year mark, whichever comes first. Exclusive rights run for
three years. If the patentee qualifies at the end of the exclusive
patent term, exclusive rights continue for another three years. If
the patentee still qualifies at the conclusion of the second term of
exclusivity, the exclusionary right renews for another three years,
and so on until the entire enforceable patent interest is exhausted
and the patent is turned over to the public. If the patentee does
not qualify for exclusive rights to continue at the time when the
exclusionary period must be renewed, then the patent enters a state
of mandatory licensing.
There still exist many other detailed questions as to how to
manage and restrict patentees' rights in their patents and the effect
of willfulness or neglect in misuse of the system. One such concern
is that someone may intentionally use the patented technology and
not seek a mandatory license. In such a case, the patentee should be
afforded the proper protection to encourage users to come forward.
113. See Standard Oil v. United States, 283 U.S. 163, 171 n.5 (1931) ("A patent may be
rendered quite useless, or 'blocked,' by another unexpired patent which covers a vitally related
feature of the manufacturing process."). The rationale would be the same as if the patentee
were practicing the patent, or setting up an opportunity for a cross-license, a legitimate and
desirable effect of patent law. Id. See also ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 32, at
239-46.
114. The numbers were chosen without regard to any predetermined reference point;
however, the five-year period and three-year renewable exclusivity periods approximate U.S.
patent law's maintenance fees, required every four years to maintain patent rights beginning
at three and a half years from the date of issue. 37 C.F.R. § 1.20(e) (2007).
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A court could impose as a remedy an injunction of the use of the
patented technology until any monetary judgment is paid, including
treble damages if applied, and a license agreement has been ordered or agreed upon."' Another consideration is whether to allow
patentees to recapture exclusivity after having lost it. If allowed, it
would be important to provide safe harbors for users of the technology during the time when exclusivity was not claimed. Practically
speaking, allowing recapture would open the door for abuse by
patentees who would, as a tactic, let their patent exclusivity lapse,
and then reassert exclusivity to sue for injunction as a bargaining
tool.
Making an assertion of exclusivity should require that it be done
in good faith, the effect being that if the patentee makes an
assertion of exclusivity, yet knew that the patent did not qualify,
then that would rise to the level of patent misuse, and the patentee
would lose all rights in the patent. The penalty has to be stiff if the
system is to work, and thus the burden to show good faith should be
low. Doctrines tempering the low burden could include any evidence
that products or sales were fabricated for the primary or sole
purpose of remaining eligible for exclusivity-a bad faith factor.
Five years as an initial limit on beginning the period of exclusive
rights should give patentees enough time to really know the
invention-its market potential, its role in leading to other
patentable inventions, and its place in the patentee's overall
personal or corporate strategy-regardless of whether the patent
had been issued. This limit also serves as a counterbalance to patent
applicants who would delay issuance of the patent as a tactic. Three
years of exclusivity per renewable period are proposed for several
reasons. Three years should give the patentee the time to determine
whether to make the efforts necessary to maintain the exclusive
right or let the patent become available for mandatory licensing.
The three years also allow the patentee the ability to adjust strategy
based on the market performance of the patented product, rather
than simply revoking exclusive rights immediately on some
event-such as bankruptcy or supply issues-that would otherwise
render the patentee unable to maintain exclusive rights until
rectification of such a situation. Finally, it allows the patentee to
115. See 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006).
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recover exclusive rights if, within a period of exclusivity the patent
enters a state which would not allow exclusivity to continue, but, by
the end of the three11years,
a condition for renewed exclusivity has
6
been reestablished.
For example, in the table manufacturer hypothetical above, recall
that table manufacturer G could be excluded from manufacturing
her operating table as long as any one of A through F desired to
enjoin her from doing so. In the proposed system, if A licenses to
B-F,then A must license to G. Likewise, if B licenses to C-F, then B
must license to G, and so on. Only F, who licenses to no one, could
seek to enjoin G from manufacturing operating tables. This makes
sense because the scope of G's patent is more similar to the scope of
F's patent, and if F manufactures a competing operating table, F's
patent should serve as a means of keeping G out of the marketplace.
If F does not practice the patent, however, then G could force F to
license the patent to her once F's patent is in a mandatory licensing
state.
The following sections explore in greater depth the conditions
that would allow the exclusionary period to renew, the procedural
aspects of renewing exclusive rights, and exactly how the mandatory
license would work.
B. Application of the Renewal of the ExclusionaryRight
1. Conditionsfor Allowing the Right To Renew
To encourage inventors to solve their problems through innovation, two situations that satisfy the conditions for renewability of
the exclusionary right are: (1) where the patentee practices a patent,
and (2) where the patentee practices a patent closely related to the
one she does not. For example, a manufacturer of a medical screw
may hold ten patents on ten variations of the medical screw, each
one patentably distinct from the others, but not distinct enough to
create a market for all ten variations. Moreover, were the patent
owner forced to license one of the nonpracticed patents after the
116. Of course, the condition for reestablishing exclusivity must not be a sham, only done
for the sake of renewing exclusive patent rights. See, e.g., Mahurkar v. Impra, Inc., 71 F.3d
1573, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (concluding that a sale was a "sham" which did not trigger the "on
sale" bar of 37 U.S.C. § 102(b)).
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exclusionary period had expired, the marketability of the screw she
manufactures would suffer because of the relatedness between the
patents she does and does not practice.
To help contrast which patent owners the proposed framework
would affect, there are two situations which should not qualify a
patent for an extension of exclusionary rights: (1) the patentee
licenses the patent to multiple organizations, and (2) the patentee
117
simply holds on to the patent.
The paramount factor in determining whether a situation
satisfies the condition for renewability should be that the patentee
either did not voluntarily dilute the exclusive right by choosing to
exclude some but not others, or that the patentee did not use the
exclusive right by making use of the patent herself. Other specific
policy goals of society, however, such as combating hunger and
disease, providing affordable medicines to third-world nations, or
developing alternative renewable energy sources, could allow
exclusivity renewability in key technological areas.11 But in the
normal case, the key to determining whether the exclusionary right
persists is whether the patentee exercises the right. As the clich6
posits, "If you don't use it, you lose it." In determining other
qualifications allowing the extension of exclusivity, the reasons
arguably should further the goal of promoting progress.11 9
2. Forward-Looking/Backward-LookingImplementation
The logistics of how to renew the exclusionary right are important, for a change in patent law that places too much burden on the
system through increased transaction costs and delays would surely

117. A closer call would be where a patent owner exclusively licenses a patent in return for
some percentage of sales associated with the product because the patent owner is still
retaining an interest in the patent which varies on the market value of the patent and is
therefore not truly exclusive. This would be less of a problem if the patentee exclusively
licensed the patent for a flat rate because, although the patentee retains an interest in the
patent, it would look more like a lease.
118. For example, an inventor that creates a revolutionary battery technology maybe given
the option to exercise limited licenses to help offset the possible disincentive that mandatory
licensing might present, giving potentially greater remuneration when society perceives a
much greater utility than the average invention.
119. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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fail. 20 Perhaps the best approach would be to require patentees to
claim their exclusionary right, filing a statement with the USPTO
to accompany the patent file every three years.'2 1 The claim need
not be examined for accuracy or for actual compliance with the
requirements for exclusivity, but it would serve to announce to the
public (1) that the patentee asserts that she has a legal right to
exclude and (2) on what basis the patentee believes she qualifies for
the right under the accepted conditions for exclusivity. It would also
bind the patentee to the assertion. Subsequent litigation could use
those statements to show whether they were made in good faith or
in misconduct and to show actual notice to the infringer. On receipt
of an infringement notice from a patentee, the alleged infringer
could examine the statements claiming exclusionary rights and
determine whether to continue infringing, seek a declaratory judgment of noninfringement or patent invalidity, or cease infringement
and develop a workaround.
C. Application of the Mandatory Licensing Period
The mandatory licensing period serves three primary purposes:
it keeps licensing agreements fair, encourages innovation where
innovators would have been previously enjoined, and moves up the
time at which society gains free market access to the patented
technology. In all cases of mandatory licensing, the patentee will
still get paid for use of the patent. The patent is a property right,
but the mandatory licensing period simply unbundles the right to
exclude.

120. The change would also likely need to be compatible with international treaties that
the United States has signed dealing with patents and intellectual property. An exhaustive
analysis of this aspect is beyond the scope of this Note, but the most comprehensive treaty
covering patent law, the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPS), reveals that TRIPS allows a member country to determine provisions for compulsory
licensing. WTO, Intellectual Property (TRIPS)-TRIPS and Public Health: Compulsory
Licensing of Pharmaceuticals and TRIPS, http://www.wto.orgtenglish/tratop-e/trips-e/public
_healthfaq-e.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2009). See generally Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1197. Brazil, a member of
TRIPS, has compulsory licensing provisions with pharmaceuticals. See infra note 168.
121. Inventors must similarly file a signed oath upon filing of a patent application. 35
U.S.C. § 115 (2006).
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1. Reasonable Royalty
To assess damages in infringement suits, courts use a calculated
reasonable royalty rate. 122 A reasonable royalty rate is also used to
calculate the value of provisional patent rights for infringement that
occurs between the publication of a patent application and the
issuance of a patent. 123 For example, a patent applicant may notify
a potential infringer that the product it is producing would violate
her patent once it has issued.' 24 In other words, the right to exclude
does not start until the patent is issued, but for the time lapse
between when the infringer is notified and the issuance of the
patent, the patent25applicant can collect a reasonable royalty for use
of her invention.1
Because of its familiarity in patent law already, the reasonable
royalty is likely the best candidate for assessing the cost of the
mandatory licensing period of this framework. The reasonable
royalty is supposed to represent the fair market value added to the
infringing use.126 In the mandatory licensing period, the patentee
would still maintain the property right and so would be entitled to
the fair market value of the technology until the patent expires. A
distinct difference between the reasonable royalty rate of an
infringement suit and that of the mandatory licensing period is that
in an infringement suit the rate is for past infringement, whereas
in the mandatory licensing period, the rate is for a continuing
27
license.
2. Calculatingthe Mandatory License
Because the license is mandatory (the outcome is always a
license), it could be implemented through arbitration, mediating

122. Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 37, at 1995-2000.
123. 35 U.S.C. § 154(d)(1) (2006).
124. See id. § 154(d)(1)(B) (requiring actual notice).
125. Id. § 154(d).
126. Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 37, at 1995-2000.
127. See Amado v. Microsoft Corp., 517 F.3d 1353, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2008) ('There is a
fundamental difference, however, between a reasonable royalty for pre-verdict infringement
and damages for post-verdict infringement.").
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licensing terms for the remainder of the patent's enforceable life.12 8
This Note does not consider the merits of arbitration, but suggests
it as an efficient way to achieve compulsory licensing because
arbitration can accommodate some of the concerns of compulsory
licenses.1 29 Mark Lemley and Carl Shapiro set forth a structure for
calculating the value of the patent to the product in a technology
setting; however, their basic calculation could be used as a base
value determined in any patent infringement action.1 0
Before arbitration or some other legal remedy is used, the parties
would have an opportunity to negotiate a licensing agreement in the
free market. 131 Because the outcome of the negotiation is always a
license, either determined by a judicial body or by the parties
themselves, the parties
have a strong incentive to reach an agree1 2
ment on their own. 3
The arbitrator would not find whether the patent is valid, but
instead would determine a sliding scale of validity-the patent
strength. 33 Consider the judicial quandary of NTP v. RIM and how
the court's judgment has been essentially turned on its head by the
USPTO.' 34 If the court instead could have declared that the patents
in question were more likely valid than not, and imposed a compulsory license rather than an injunction, a subsequent reexamination
in the USPTO would not be completely contrary to the findings of
the district court. Indeed, an infringer may wish to avoid the
uncertainty of requesting reexamination and license the patentee's
technology willingly-resulting in a net increase in licensing overall.
128. Arbitration would allow expert third-party arbitrators to consider case-by-case
attributes. See Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 5 (2006).
129. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, OVERDOSE: HOW EXCESSIVE GOVERNMENT REGULATION
STIFLES PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION 49-50 (2006) (arguing that a compulsory licensing
system must have provisions dealing with the same things that voluntary licensing would:
sharing of research results, assignment of rights, delegation of duties, sharing of trade secrets,
definition of net sales, etc.).
130. Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 37, at 1995-2000. The patent must be evaluated at least
for its strength, then the strength is multiplied by its overall contribution to the product, and
adjusted by the net effect of using an alternative. Id. at 1996-97.
131. Id. at 1995-2000.
132. See generallySteven J. Elleman, Problemsin PatentLitigation: MandatoryMediation
May Provide Settlements and Solutions, 12 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 759 (1997) (discussing
the difficulties of litigating patent disputes and the desirability of alternative dispute
resolution).
133. Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 37, at 1996-97.
134. See supra notes 63-69 and accompanying text.
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Assuming that NTP appeals the final rejections of their patents to
the Federal Circuit and the Federal Circuit upholds the rejections,
the unique occurrence would have happened where the same court
has had the same patents come before it and reached two opposite
results as to their validity.
D. ParallelArguments and Practices
1. Past Arguments for Compulsory Licensing
Although this Note's argument tying the right to exclude with the
exercise or dilution of the right in the proposed framework is novel,
certainly the idea of compulsory licensing provisions in patent law
is not. Indeed, the Senate in the Patent Act of 1790 proposed a
provision for compulsory licensing that was rejected by the House.' 35
Commentators have generally disdained the power inherent in
the right to exclude, applied to the marketplace and technology of
today.'36 But even as many as sixty years ago one commentator
called upon the exclusionary right to be "conditionally exclusive.' 3 7
Another early commentator determined that compulsory licensing,
if enacted, would be constitutional.' 38 Even a study sponsored by the
Senate Judiciary Committee yielded the suggestion of compulsory
licensing as many as fifty years ago. 3 9 The patent system of India
has a time limit to exclusivity that is similar to this Note's proposed
framework.' 4 ° The Indian patent system has been used to argue that
135. BRUCE W. BUGBY, GENESIS OF AMERICAN PATENT AND COPYRIGHT LAW 143 (1967).
136. See JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 42, at 60-64 (arguing that exclusivity and crosslicensing creates a restriction in competition); LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS 116
(2001) ('"he extreme protections of property are neither needed for ideas nor beneficial.");
Richard T. Jackson, A Lockean Approach to the Compulsory Patent Licensing Controversy, 9
J. TECH. L. & POL'Y 117 (2004) (arguing for broader use of compulsory licensing); Pankaj
Tandon, Optimal Patents with Compulsory Licensing, 90 J. POL. ECON. 470 (1982) (arguing
that compulsory licensing may mitigate the monopoly problem associated with patents).
137. Nicholas A. Vonneuman, Conditionally Exclusive PatentRights and the Patent Clause
of the Constitution,5 AM. J. COMP. L. 391, 394 (1956).
138. Frank I. Schecter, Would Compulsory Licensing of Patents Be Unconstitutional?,22
VA. L. REV. 287, 313-14 (1936).
139. STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS AND COPYRIGHTS, S. COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, 84TH CONG., PROPOSALS FOR IMPROVING THE PATENT SYSTEM 25-26 (Comm. Print
1956).
140. The Patents Act, No. 39 of 1970, § 84(1); India Code (1970) (allowing a compulsory
license after three years from grant if "the reasonable requirements of the public with respect
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compulsory licensing should be more quickly available in less
developed countries primarily to allow those countries faster access
to generic versions of effective pharmaceuticals. 141 In the area of
biotechnology, a fair use exception combined with strict licensing
regulation has been suggested to ease hold up and royalty stacking
effects in biotechnology research. 142 One commentator has even
suggested similar compulsory licensing for a more elaborate
experimental use exception with regard to research tools. 14 ' The

main purpose of compulsory licensing is to overcome the right to
exclude, allowing access to the patent sooner. Abandonment of the
patent presents another way to overcome the right to exclude.
Although this can be done explicitly by the patentee through a
dedication to the public, the USPTO44 encourages abandonment
through escalating maintenance fees.

2. Patent MaintenanceFees
The USPTO currently requires periodic "maintenance fees" to
retain the rights of utility patents. 4 This fee represents no
examination work burden on the USPTO, and so the continual
escalation of the maintenance fee suggests that it is prohibitive
enough that, as the patent ages, it serves as a means to weed out
the patents to which patentees no longer think the exclusive rights
are worth maintaining.'4 6 The USPTO could increase these maintenance fees both in frequency and amount. If it did, patentees with
to the patented invention have not been satisfied or that the patented invention is not
available to the public at a reasonable price").
141. Le-Nhung McLeland & J. Herbert O'Toole, Patent Systems in Less Developed
Countries: The Cases of India and the Andean Pact Countries, 2 J.L. & TECH. 229, 244-45
(1987).
142. Laurie L. Hill, The Race to Patent the Genome: FreeRiders, Hold Ups, and the Future
of Medical Breakthroughs, 11 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 221, 254-55 (2003).

143. Katherine J. Strandburg, What Does the Public Get? Experimental Use and the Patent
Bargain,2004 WIS. L. REV. 81, 138-45.
144. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.321(a) (2007) (terminal disclaimer and dedication to the public).
145. Id. § 1.20(e)-(g) (stating fees to be $900, $2300, $3800 at 3.5, 7.5, and 11.5 years,
respectively).
146. A parallel exists in copyright, in that the majority of copyright rights are given away
freely by their owners when it becomes clear there is no potential remuneration available. See,
e.g., William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copyright, 70 U. CHI.
L. REV. 471, 473-74 (2003).

1426

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50:1395

valuable patents or the ability to pay would pay the fees without
hesitation, whereas patentees with a patent that has no market
value would let their rights expire. This proposed framework is a
middle ground, allowing patent rights to continue, but giving society
the ability to access the technology sooner.

III. OUTCOME ASSESSMENTS
A. The Patent Interest
The interests of society are a complex system of balances that
cannot be easily captured. For simplicity of argument, this Note
assumes that society's primary interest in granting to inventors
their patent comes down to use-encompassing derivative use,
present use, future use, use to improve the quality of life, and use
to promote competition and lower prices. In the context of this Note,
this assumption probably has no negative impact on other potential
societal interests in patent law, such as the desire to be a world
leader in innovation. There could be an effect, however, in political
interest and philosophies of political parties. For example, while
this Note is not necessarily anti-business, its proposals ultimately
would reduce patenting rights, which would affect all businesses
directly or indirectly.
Likewise, this Note assumes that inventors and businesses who
own patents share the same essential interests and that the
primary interest in seeking patent protection is monetaryencompassing product sales, patent licensing, marketplace health
(to drive sales/licensing), protection market share, and future money
potential by derivative patents. This assumption is subject to the
criticism that universities and public institutions research and
develop for reasons beyond mere monetary returns; however,
seeking patent protection over defensive publication, a publication
that would prevent anyone from obtaining a patent is evidence that
money, although not necessarily a direct cause of research, is a
direct cause of patent application.1 47 Furthermore, many of the
interests of businesses and inventors are irreconcilable in the areas
of incentive, strategy, cost, and ease of patenting-small-time
147. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006).
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inventors are at a distinct disadvantage due to their more limited
resources. 4 ' The subject matter of this Note may affect incentive
as the small-time inand strategy, but not significantly insofar
1 49
concerned.
is
business
big
ventor and
B. Standardof Success
The standard of success for any change to patent law is an
enhancement of the propensity to promote progress.' 5° The shortened time frame of exclusivity would have one of three outcomes:
dampen the spirit of innovation, heighten the spirit of innovation,
or have no effect at all. The actual change in the patent law most
analogous to the one proposed is the change of the term of a patent
from seventeen years from issue to twenty years from filing.' 5 ' At
the time, there was much debate about the effect the change would
have on innovation.' 52 The actual effect, however, did not seem to
stifle innovation; patent applications have increased every year
since 1994, and in 2005 were more than twice what they were in
1994.1'3 In this Note's proposed framework, the patentee would
148. Robert E. Thomas, Vanquishing Copyright Pirates and Patent Trolls: The Divergent
Evolution of Copyright and Patent Laws, 43 AM. BUS. L.J. 689, 729 (2006).
149. But see id. (arguing that the decreasing likelihood of permanent injunction harms the
capacity of small entities to enforce patents).
150. See Grant v. Raymond, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 218, 241 (1832) ("To promote the progress of
useful arts, is the interest and policy of every enlightened government."); Hilton Davis Chem.
Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1536 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (Newman, J., concurring)
fostering technological progress, investment in research and
("[P]atent law is directed to ...
development, capital formation, entrepreneurship, innovation, national strength and
international competitiveness.").
151. See Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 532, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994)
(codified as 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2006)).
152. PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY SPECIAL EQUITY ACT OF 1996, S. REP. No. 104-394, at 13
(1996) ('The 20-year patent term was a very contentious issue. Congress held hearings on this
matter and heard from many in industry, especially the pharmaceutical and biotechnology
industry, who had concerns that the 20-year term might erode patent terms in this country.");
see also id. ("It was a major sacrifice on the part of the biotechnology and the pharmaceutical
industries to support the 20-year provisions of the URAA in favor of harmonized patent rules
internationally. With a 20-year term from filing, applicants, including pharmaceutical and
biotechnology applicants, are no longer able to extend their patent terms through intentional
delay in the Patent and Trademark Office.").
153. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. PATENT ACTIVITY, CALENDAR YEARS 1790 TO
THE PRESENT at 1 (Apr. 23, 2008), availableat http://www.uspto.gov/web/officeslactido/oeip/
taf/h_counts.pdf.
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suffer a major loss-patent exclusivity-if she did not qualify for a
renewable exclusionary period. This would certainly result in some
stifling of innovation, but the overall effect on innovation would
likely be an increase because other inventors would gain access to
patented subject matter sooner. If a statistical analysis could be
made that correlated compulsory licensing with its impact on
innovation, a serious endogeneity problem would suggest the use of
another measure-perhaps the number of patents applications filed.
Two problems with such an analysis are that court-imposed
compulsory licensing seldom occurs such that there would be too few
data points, and that the risk of employing another measure to
overcome the endogeneity problem invites logic errors from the lack
of identifying other variables that could also be affecting the chosen
index. Rather than attempt to identify by statistics how the
proposed framework would affect innovation, a pragmatic argument
is made in the following sections by attempting to analyze how two
different market sectors would be affected by the framework.
C. The PharmaceuticalIndustry
1. Perspective
One of the largest proponents of strict exclusionary interests is
the pharmaceutical industry."' This industry has huge profit
potential but is subjected to outside regulation, potential liability,
and capital risk in developing new drugs.155 Drug companies have
two strong arguments to support exclusionary rights. First, only
about 10 percent of developed drugs are successfully brought to
market-pharmaceutical companies take a gamble with every
154. Brief for Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturing of America as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Respondent at 2, eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006) (No. 05130) ("As practitioners in an industry where research and development are expensive and
competition is fierce, PhRMA's members need strong patent protection to be able to recoup
the costs of their investments.").
155. See MARCIA ANGELL, THE TRUTH ABOUT THE DRUG COMPANIES: How THEY DECEIVE
Us AND WHAT To Do ABoUT IT 11 (2004). In 2002, in conjunction with the rest of the economic
turndown, pharmaceutical profits dropped from 18.5 percent to 17.0 percent; however, the
combined profits for the ten drug companies in the Fortune 500-$35.9 billion-were still
more than the profits for all the other 490 organizations combined-$33.7 billion. Id. Another
2.7 percent drop in profits occurred in 2003, but drug companies' profits were still well above
the median profit of 4.6 percent for all industries. Id.
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development of a new drug.'56 Second, because of the regulations of
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and delays in the Patent
Office, they might argue that they have a shortened time to enforce
or practice their patent before it expires. 5 v
Although bringing new drugs to suffering people who need them
is a noble endeavor, the primary interest for a pharmaceutical
company is profit. This is reflected in R & D, marketing, and patent
strategies. Drug companies often spend a lot of money developing
"me-too" drugs, which are drugs classified by the FDA as being no
better than what was already available.' 8 These drugs, combined
with marketing and patent strategies, can prolong market protection for essentially the same drug as the one that is no longer
protected by patents.5 9 One of the more recent examples of this in
practice is AstraZeneca's Nexium heartburn drug. As AstraZeneca's
previous heartburn medicine, Prilosec, neared the expiration of its
patent rights, Nexium was introduced in 2001.6 ° Prilosec had been
producing about $6 billion in annual sales, so the loss of exclusivity
would likely have been a devastating blow to sales as generics
appeared on the market.' 6 ' Notwithstanding the similarity of the
chemical formulas for Prilosec and Nexium, AstraZeneca was able
to procure patent protection on Nexium and spent about $500
million marketing the new product.'6 2
156. See DAVID B. RESNIK, OWNING THE GENOME 67 (2004) ("Only 30 percent of the drugs
a pharmaceutical company develops will make it through the R & D process and be brought
to the market. Only one third of those will be deemed to be successful. Thus, about 10 percent
of the drugs developed net a profit.").
157. See id. (arguing that because it takes on average ten years to test a new drug and
bring it to market, plus the three years in the Patent Office, companies have only seven years
of patent protection to recoup the $500 million average cost to get the drug to the market). But
see Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98
Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355 (1994)) (allowing for recovery of
patent term due to FDA process).
158. ANGELL, supra note 155, at 75 (showing that from 1998 to 2002, of the 415 new drugs
approved by the FDA, 77 percent were "me-too" drugs).
159. Id.
160. Id. at 77 & n.4.
161. Id. at 77.
162. Id. (explaining that Prilosec is a mixture of an active form of the omeprazole molecule
and isomers (inactive form of the same molecule), whereas Nexium is simply the active form
isolated). Ironically, in four FDA drug trials sponsored by AstraZeneca comparing Nexium at
two to four times the normal dose with the predecessor Prilosec given at its normal dose, it
was demonstrated that in only two of the trials Nexium was marginally more effective that
Prilosec. Id. at 78-79 & n.5.
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Despite the sometimes dubious practices of the pharmaceutical
industry, the evidence suggests that, overall, the drug system in the
United States is working-that is, producing new and better
drugs." 3 The question is whether the current patent system and
accompanying laws provide too much protection, resulting in profits
not commensurate with the value of the patent to innovation. In
contrast to the U.S. patent system, until recently in India drugs
were not themselves patentable, but only the process of making the
drugs.'6 4 As a result, India's pharmaceutical industry rapidly went
from new development with a large percentage of transnational
pharmaceutical companies to companies that simply concentrated
on copying patented drugs abroad, but with different processes."'
Likewise, European drug companies, with restrictions on the free
market effect of drug sales, have floundered compared to the
companies in United States. 66 The success of United States drug
companies domestically, however, comes at a global cost because of
the relative wealth of the nations of the world along with the
growing number of third-world countries entreating to recognize
U.S. patent law." 7 Access to infringing use is cut off, and because

163. See ALFONSO GAMBARDELLA, LUIGI ORSENIGO & FABIO PAMMOLLI, REPORT FOR THE
ENTERPRISE DIRECTORATE-GENERAL OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION, GLOBAL
COMPETITIVENESS IN PHARMACEUTICALS: A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE 36-42 (2000), available
at http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise-papers/pdf/enterprise-paper 01 2001.pdf.
164. Compare The Patents Act, No. 39 of 1970; India Code (1970), with The Patents
(Amendment) Act, No. 15, of 2005; India Code (2002) (omitting section 5, restricting the
patentability of drugs).

165. Carsten Fink, Patent Protection, TransnationalCorporations,and Market Structure:
A SimulationStudy of the IndianPharmaceuticalIndustry, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
DEVELOPMENT 227, 228-31 (Carsten Fink & Keith E. Maskus eds., 2005). Because of the lack
of pharmaceutical patent protection in India, the market share of transnational
pharmaceutical companies declined from as high as 90 percent in 1970 to 39 percent in 1993.
Furthermore, profitability declined from about 15 percent to 1 percent in the same
approximate period and most R & D activity by Indian-owned firms has concentrated on
imitating or adapting pharmaceutical products abroad. Id.
166. See generally GAMBARDELLA, ORSENIGO & PAMMOLLI, supra note 163 (explaining that
the U.S. pharmaceutical industry has flourished compared with the same industry in Europe
due to the free market that the United States provides).
167. See PETER DRAHOS, INFORMATION FEUDALISM: WHO OWNS THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY?

10-12 (2002) (arguing that TRIPS benefits primarily the U.S. and European Union and that
the effect on less developed countries is to limit severely their citizens' freedom while giving
up their own sovereignty over something as fundamental as property).

2009]

HARMONIZING THE EXCLUSIONARY RIGHTS OF PATENTS

1431

the people cannot afford legitimate use, essentially all access is
eliminated.168
The biomedical field supports the pharmaceutical industry by
performing federally funded and privately endowed research. In
some senses biomedical researchers are the same as the R & D arm
of a pharmaceutical company, but they often seek innovation for the
sake of innovation and academia, not money. Much of the biotechnology research and development in the United States is done by
public and private universities and by the government through the
National Institute of Health.'6 9 Prior to the Bayh-Dole Act of 1975,
patents procured on research projects funded by government money
were in the public domain-anyone could develop and use them. 7 °
The problem was that pharmaceutical companies, the most likely
user of biotechnology innovations, did not think the risk worth the
reward to develop the innovation into a marketable product. Food
and Drug Administration testing and expense, along with the fact
that as soon as a successful product was made generic drug
companies could come in and quickly recreate what was done, stifled
the development of publicly funded biomedical research into
marketable products.
2. Effects of the Mandatory License
Although mandatory licensing would limit the rights of pharmaceutical companies in certain contexts that would probably have a
direct negative effect on innovation, a correlative encouragement of

168. Brazil has combated its HIV/AIDS problem through pharmaceutical legislation.
Although it provides patent protection for pharmaceuticals, through compulsory licensing
provisions is able to provide antiretroviral therapy for $0.57 per day per person. As a result,
Brazil does not face the crisis that many African countries do. Id. at 8-9.
169. Clive Cookson, Universities Drive Biotech Advancement, FIN. TIMES, May 7, 2007, at
8; see Richard P. Rozek & Bridget A. Dickensheets, Encouraging Cooperation Among the
Academic, Government and Private Sectors in US Biomedical R&D, in THE INTELLEcTUAL
PROPERTY DEBATE: PERSPECTIVES FROM LAW, ECONOMICS, AND POITICAL ECONOMY 118, 133

(Meir Perez Pugatch ed., 2006) (arguing that progress in biomedical R & D requires the
cooperation among the academic, government, and private sectors due to the multi-tiered
approach to biomedical development).
170. See University and Small Business Patent Procedures Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-212
(2000).
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innovation occurs in two ways.' 7 ' First, access would be improved to
patented technology so that an inventor could improve on the work
of another without undue hardship.' Second, because pharmaceutical companies would qualify for exclusive rights extensions for
patents that they own and practice, they would be encouraged to
develop drugs in-house, while university- and government-sponsored research would continue, resulting in more research efforts
overall.' 7 ' The net effect would lean toward an increase in the
encouragement of innovation.
Pharmaceutical companies are powerhouses of profit. One might
think that the proposed framework would diminish the industry's
bottom line, but the FDA already gives exclusivity incentives to
pharmaceutical companies that help commercialize federally funded
drugs.'7 4 Bristol-Myers Squibb profited by billions of dollars under
this type of arrangement.' 7 ' Research by the National Cancer
Institute (NCI) in the 1960s revealed that paclitaxel could be highly
effective against tumors, but with little progress made over the next
twenty-five years, and with the National Institute of Health (NIH)
unable to provide enough paclitaxel to continue clinical studies,
the technology was transferred to Bristol-Myers Squibb for commercialization.' 76 Worldwide sales of the brand name paclitaxel,
Taxol, were $9 billion as of 2003.' In return for their $183 million
171. Complicated and comprehensive patent protection may stifle some innovation. See
DRAHOS, supra note 167, at 3 ("When a group of scientists stop working on a protein molecule
because there are too many intellectual property rights that surround the use of the molecule,
a basic freedom, the freedom to research, has been interfered with."); EPSTEIN, supra note 129,
at 47 ("[Miultiplemonopolies of separate patent holders prevent the coordination of research
efforts needed for the further development of pharmaceutical products.").
172. The starting period could be adjusted for the delays in the FDA as in the HatchWaxman Act for Patent Restoration. See Drug Price Competition and Patent Term
Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified as amended at 21
U.S.C. § 355 (1994)). The Act also gives the FDA the ability to allow a pharmaceutical product
to be produced exclusively by one company in certain situations. Id.
173. Prior to the Bayh-Dole Act, pharmaceuticals had no right to an exclusive license on
federally funded biotechnology research patents. See University and Small Business Patent
Procedures Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-212 (2000). In contrast, government and university research
funding does not come with the expectation of monetary returns.
174. See Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355 (1994)).
175. ANGELL, supra note 155, at 58-59, 66.
176. Rozek & Dickensheets, supra note 169, at 132.
177. ANGELL, supra note 155, at 66. Moreover, the author argues that the assistance that
Bristol-Myers Squibb provided to gain exclusivity from the FDA was not much more than
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investment, the NCI and NIH received only $35 million of $9 billion
in sales, while Medicare further paid Bristol-Myers
Squibb hun17
dreds of millions of dollars for treatments. 3
These measures already ensure that pharmaceutical companies
have extended special market protection, but the framework could
also provide profit protection as one of the reasons for exclusivity
extensions. It could borrow from section 18 of the 1836 Patent Act,
which provided for patent term extensions if the patentee "failed to
obtain, from the use and sale of his invention [during the normal
patent term], a reasonable remuneration for the time, ingenuity,
and expense .... ,179 This same reasoning could allow exclusionary
extensions when the pharmaceutical patentee is progressing toward
reasonable remuneration. Once the patentee has sufficiently
profited,'8 ° the exclusionary right should be abrogated and the
patentee subjected to mandatory licensing. In the case of Taxol,
more money would be returned to NIH, which could then fund even
more progressive research.
But without these extra protections for pharmaceutical companies, mandatory licensing of pharmaceuticals could potentially slow
new drug development, as in the days before the Bayh-Dole Act,
which allowed pharmaceutical companies to gain exclusive rights to
publicly funded research."8 ' The question becomes whether the
entire patent system should be engrossed by the interests of
pharmaceutical companies. As the costs of drug development
increase, supporting pharmaceutical companies' innovation through
the patent system becomes a value judgment for society. There may
exist better alternatives to achieve the same interest in innovation
at less of a cost on the entire patent system.

funding a third-party chemical company to produce the chemical compound and clinical
research trials. Id.
178. Id. at 58-59, 66.
179. Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, § 18, 5 Stat. 117, 125 (repealed 1860).
180. The cost of bringing a drug to market has been widely disputed. Compare RESNIK,
supra note 156, at 67 (finding a $500 million average cost to get a drug to the market), with
Christopher P. Adams & Van V. Brantner, Estimatingthe Cost of New Drug Development: Is
It Really $802 Million?, 25 HEALTH AFFAIRS 420, 427 (2006) ("Our estimate of $868 million
suggests, if anything, that $802 million is an underestimate."); Joseph A. DiMasi, et al., The
Priceof Innovation:New Estimates of Drug Development Costs, 22 J. HEALTH ECON. 151, 166,
181 (2003) (finding an $802 million average).
181. See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
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D. The Patent Licensing Industry
1. Perspective
The rainmaker situation for a patent licensing company (PLC) is
torpedo enforcement, completely unexpected and devastatingly
damaging. Because the business model of a PLC is to enforce the
exclusionary rights of patents through licensing and suing, it has a
real incentive to hold patents quietly and enforce strategically for
maximum gain.'82 Some argue this is a legitimate business practice,
while others say it is not fair play, as it twists the system beyond its
intentions. 8 '
The PLC wants exclusive rights for as long as can be had. PLCs
of today are not unlike Jerome Lemelson of old.' In his life,
Lemelson acquired 558 patents primarily by researching what
others were doing and then drafting patent claims to cover their
inventions.'8 5 PLCs look for patents to acquire and hold.18 6 They
then regularly scour the market for potentially infringing patents,
investigate potential infringers, and take action on the likely
candidates."8 7 If they do not license or sue, then they are not making
money. Also, by waiting to sue, whole industries will unknowingly
rely more on the technology covered by the patent. When the patent
is enforced, the PLC can pursue a whole industry sector for
royalties.18
An example of this began in 2003, when Acacia Technologies
began to assert its patents covering streaming media against
hundreds of online adult sites.'8 9 Nevermind that streaming media
182. See STOBBS, supra note 78, at 217 (explaining "submarine patents").
183. See generally James F. McDonough III, The Myth of the Patent Troll: An Alternative
View of the Function of Patent Dealersin an Idea Economy, 56 EMORY L.J. 189 (2007).
184. See supra notes 78-82 and accompanying text.
185. STOBBS, supra note 78, at 216 (explaining that Lemelson filed and kept up with his
patent applications as a full time job). Lemelson and the modern patent troll are similar in
that both have a strategic advantage in waiting until the market is ripe with the product
before enforcing their patents.
186. See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 37, at 1995.
187. Id.
188. One patent owner charges 0.75 percent royalty for patents that do not cover industry
standards and 3.5 percent for patents that do. Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 37, at 2009.
189. Xenia Kobylarz, Extreme Makeover: How Acacia Technologies, Once Derided as a
Patent Troll, Grew Up and Got Respectable, IP LAW & BUSINESS, Feb. 2007, at 24; Jonathan
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had been around since at least 1995."9 Once these sites started
caving in to the threats of lawsuit and licensing Acacia's patents,
Acacia had the momentum and credibility to arrange licensing
with companies like the Walt Disney Company, Bloomberg, and
LodgeNet. 9'
Prolific infringement demonstrates an upside to the PLC in that
patent validity can be immaterial in a market with a cross-population of infringers if the PLC extorts a relatively small licensing fee
from each alleged infringer.'9 2 Because these infringers are usually
in competition with each other, there is not enough of an advantage
in spending millions of dollars litigating the validity of the patent
when the 193
net effect helps the competition more than the accused
infringer.

Due to the nature of the business model of the PLC and the way
the patent system works, the highest potential for remuneration
comes by waiting to assert until there is a successful product in the
market that infringes. 9 4 The PLC has no incentive to cross-license
because it does not practice the patent; thus, money is the only
compensation that an alleged infringer can offer.'9 5
Royalty stacking is a practice in which several members of a
patent thicket assert their patent rights against a technological
product by extracting licensing fees potentially in excess of the value
of the product.'9 6 Even within something as simple as navigating a
web page, the use of a web browser implicates as many as thirty
Internet communication standards, each covered by multiplicities
of patents. 97 Patent portfolios and patent pools mitigate the
licensing problems, but do not eliminate them because participation

Krim, PatentingAir or ProtectingProperty?,WASH. POST, Dec. 11, 2003, at El.
190. See RealNetworks.com, Company, http://www.realnetworks.com/company/index.html
(last visited Feb. 28, 2009) (stating that RealNetworks released its first RealPlayer software
in 1995).
191. Kobylarz, supra note 189.
192. Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 37, at 1995.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. See JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 42, at 59-64 (explaining how cross-licensing applies
to a technology thicket).
196. Id. at 62-63.
197. Bruce Perens, The Problem of Software Patents in Standards, in 3 THE STANDARDS
EDGE: OPEN SEASON 173, 174 (Sherrie Bolin ed., 2005).
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is voluntary.' s Patent holdup is a growing concern because
"[n]onpracticing entities file 30-40% of all patent suits in the
computing and electronics industries ....
"" Moreover, the price that
patent holding companies can charge varies not on the patent, but
on its effect in the marketplace.2 " The $612 million worthless
license in the NTP case is a real world result of patent holdup.2 '
2. Effects of the Mandatory License
PLCs might be the most at risk by this proposal, because by
definition they do not practice patents and so would not qualify for
exclusivity extensions. They would still be entitled, however, to the
initial period of exclusivity. The proposal subverts the PLC strategy
of torpedo enforcement because there is less incentive to wait to
enforce the patent when the market ripens with infringers. °2 While
this strategy would not be available, the overall effect may actually
be to increase the ability for PLCs to license their patents, especially
where the compulsory licensing period would result in a fair license
for both parties. In the case of NTP v. RIM, once RIM was to be
enjoined from infringement, there was a wide discrepancy in the
parties' relative bargaining positions.2 " 3 NTP was poised to collect
from RIM the profit potential of the entire operation for the
enforceable life of the patent or until RIM could implement a
workaround. s°4 Had a reasonable and fair method of licensing been
available, NTP probably would not have had its patents reexamined
and thus held invalid.
With a significant number of all patent suits in the computing
and electronics industries coming from nonpracticing entities,
mandatory licensing could starkly affect the litigation and licensing
198. Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 37, at 2014-15. Patent portfolios and patent pools
provide standard license fee entrance into the pool to access technology. Id.
199. Id. at 2009.
200. See supra note 188.
201. See supra Part I.C.3.b.
202. See supra Part I.C.3.b.
203. See eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 396 (2006) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring); Foster v. Am. Mach. & Foundry Co., 492 F.2d 1317, 1324 (2d Cir. 1974) ("An
injunction to protect a patent against infringement ...
is not intended as a club to be wielded
by a patentee to enhance his negotiating stance.").
204. Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 37, at 2000-01.
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model in this area. 0 5 Facing a mandatory license rather than an
injunction, however, the accused infringer may prefer to pay a fair
licensing fee and avoid the cost of litigation.0 6 Moreover, the cost
of a fair licensing fee would encourage licensing by providing a reliable model. A reliable method of determining mandatory licenses
would cause the number of licenses to increase. Furthermore, due
to the mandatory availability of licensing, a greater number of
licenses would be realized because they would be less risky and less
expensive than trying to work around the patents. Although
eliminating the need to work around a patent could be an argument
against the proposed framework-many inventions are born out of
trying to solve a problem of necessity-many innovators invent
independently of any specific knowledge of the patents already in
existence. Licensing becomes a vehicle to maintain access to the
inventor's own work in hindsight rather than a vehicle to explicitly
base work upon in foresight.
The theoretical real-world effect on the pharmaceutical and PLC
industries shows a definite reduction in patent rights. In the case of
pharmaceutical companies, however, profit protection mechanisms
are already in place for those publicly funded biomedical patents
that pharmaceutical companies help bring to market. For PLCs the
proposed framework probably has less real effect in light of eBay.
The framework takes eBay further though and would level the
playing field for manufacturers who make use of a PLC's patents.
Manufacturers would benefit by knowing that even if they are sued
for infringement by a PLC, an injunction would be far less likely.
CONCLUSION

Society's interests are utilitarian-access to improved technology
and better drugs sooner but at a reasonable cost. People are looking
for Apple's new iPod, Nokia's new cell phone, safer vehicles, and
computer programs or services that enhance productivity and
entertainment. Some are willing to pay for the newest, whereas
others wait to make their purchase. The people who want the
205. See supra note 194 and accompanying text.
206. The cost of litigation is a major factor to consider. The average cost of patent litigation

in 2000 was $1.2 million. Dee Gill, Defending Your Rights: ProtectingIntellectualPropertyIs
Expensive, WALL ST. J., Sept. 25, 2000, at 6.
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newest gadgets on the market are willing to pay premium prices,
whereas the people who wait do so because they know the cost will
come down. The consumer expectation in the high-tech world of
today is that when a new technology is released, the cost will
rapidly decrease within the first few years of availability. The
length of exclusivity in patent rights does not adequately mirror the
expectations of society.
The patent system needs tweaking to serve better the interests
across more industries that rely on it. Patents exist to promote
progress, but ultimately the desire to promote progress is to benefit
society. Thomas Jefferson held a pragmatic view of the patent
system: "Society may give an exclusive right to the profits arising
from [patents], as an encouragement to men to pursue ideas which
may produce utility, but this may or may not be done, according to
the will and convenience of society, without claim or complaint from
anybody."2 7
Although exclusionary rights and compulsory licenses in patents
remain at odds, one can envision a system that encompasses the
benefits of each outcome, maintains the goal to encourage innovation, and reduces the transaction costs of patent licensing and
litigation. The geniuses that came before might have been giants or
they might have been trolls, and to help inventors stand on their
shoulders, this proposal provides a stepstool.
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